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Abstract—This research is concerned with the effectiveness
of auctions-based task assignment and management in central-
ized, participatory Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS) systems. During
auctions, sensing tasks are matched with participants based on
bids and incentives that are provided by the participants and
the platform respectively. Recent literature addressed several
challenges in auctions including untruthful bidding and malicious
participants. Our recent work started addressing another chal-
lenge, namely, the maximization of clearance rate (CR) in sensing
campaigns, i.e., the percentage of the accomplished sensing
tasks. In this research, we propose a new objective function
for matching tasks with participants, in order to achieve CR-
maximized, reputation-aware auctions. Particularly, we penalize
redundant task assignment, where a task is assigned to multiple
participants, which can consume the budget unnecessarily. We
observe that the less the bidders on a certain task, the higher the
priority it should be assigned, to get accomplished. Hence, we
introduce a new factor, the task redundancy factor in managing
auctions. Through extensive simulations under varying conditions
of sensing campaigns, and given a fixed budget, we show that
penalizing redundancy (giving higher priority to unpopular tasks)
yields significant CR increases of approximately 50%, compared
to the highest clearance rates in the recent literature.
Index Terms—Mobile crowd sensing, participant selection, task
allocation, incentive mechanisms, auctions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is an emerging paradigm in
which sensor-rich, smart, online mobile devices are used to
accomplish various sensing tasks. These tasks are requested by
service demanders from participants who are willing to share
information and sensed data, through a coordinating platform.
MCS systems have been deployed in diverse fields such as
environmental applications [1] (e.g., measuring air quality and
noise levels), infrastructure research [2] (e.g. measuring traffic
congestion and road conditions), and social applications [3]
(e.g. share restaurant information and crowd counting). Due
to their support to a wide variety of applications, centralized
participatory sensing is widely applied in MCS systems. This
framework consists of a central platform and a number of
smartphones, and requires active involvement from users in
sensing and decision-making. Recently proposed MCS appli-
cations and platforms include MOSDEN [4], Campaignr [5],
and Medusa [6]. These platforms are used mainly for task
publishing and data collection.
In MCS, one of the critical limitations is the restrained com-
putational and power resources of the sensing smartphones.
Hence, most participants need a kind of compensation in order
to participate. High-paced research has focused on developing
effective incentive mechanisms (including monetary and non-
monetary approaches [7]) in order to ensure the users’ will-
ingness to share their sensing data. In relation to the scope of
this research, we limit the discussion to monetary mechanisms.
This implies that the coordinating platform should have a
budget. The authors of [8] defined two incentive mechanisms:
1) The platform-centric model, where the static payment for
each winner is determined by the platform. 2) The user-centric
model, that is a reverse auction approach, where the platform
has no control over payments to each winner.
Among the main challenges of MCS systems is the partici-
pant selection (or similarly, the task allocation). Task allocation
techniques can be classified using diverse approaches, one of
which is the single-task [9], [10] vs. multi-task approach [11].
For the former family of methods, the platform selects the best
set of winners to perform a task, each of whom is required to
complete one task while preserving some kind of constraint
(e.g., a budget, satisfying probabilistic coverage constraints,
etc.). In [12], for example, a framework was proposed to select
an optimal set of winners while satisfying budget constraints.
The goal of [13], however, was to select participants such that
they maximize the spatial coverage of crowdsensing. Fig. 1
depicts a geographical area in which participants and tasks
are uniformly distributed, and each participant is surrounded
by an area of interest, out of which, that participant does not
bid on any tasks.
Another classification approach for the task allocation pro-
cess in MCS is discussed in [14], where the authors pre-
sented a three-model perspective of task allocation. One of
these models is the participant model which is comprised
of three kinds of participant traits (attributes, requirements,
and supplements). Most importantly, the attributes indicate
the inherent characteristics of participants and whether they
are calculated by the platform or provided by the users. In
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Fig. 1: An illustration inspired by [8] depicting participants
(red dots) interested in tasks (yellow squares) within their areas
of interest (dashed circles).
this context, the authors of [15] proposed a reputation-aware
(RA) algorithm for task allocation. Moreover, requirements
from the participants side such as privacy and energy efficiency
were addressed in [16] and [17] respectively. However, none
of the aforementioned studies considered the campaign tasks
characteristics.
While significant research attention has been given to im-
proving the task allocation and incentive mechanisms as two
important stages in MCS applications, much less attention has
addressed the maximization of the clearance rate (CR), i.e.,
the number of accomplished tasks in auction-based campaigns.
The motivation for seeking high CR is that it corroborates the
satisfaction of service demanders, since they accomplish more
tasks while preserving the existing auction constraints. Hence,
CR is directly proportional to high platform’s utility and
efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, our own recent work
in [18], [19] was the first to propose CR-maximized auctions
by using new bidding procedures that helped increasing the
CR significantly.
In this research, we pinpoint one principal reason for budget
drainage, and consequently not attaining satisfactory clearance
rates, namely, redundant task assignment. Figure 2 depicts a
case of redundant task assignment where multiple participants
simultaneously bid on a particular task. The figure also depicts
cases for bidden-on tasks that are within the range of interest
of the corresponding participants, and other cases for tasks
that are not bidden-on even though they lie within the range
of interest of the participants. The range of interest for each
participant is shown as a dashed circle with a red circle (the
participant) at its center. In the rest of this paper, we use the
terms clearance rate, task completion ratio, and task coverage
ratio interchangeably.
The contributions of this research can be summarized as
follows:
1) We propose a new bidding-based, multi-task allocation
procedure for maximizing the platform utility by max-
Fig. 2: An illustration of a task (yellow circle) with redundant
bidders i1, i2, and i3. Green circles symbolize bidden-on tasks
within the range of interest of the three participants. Blue
circles symbolize tasks that are not bidden-on, yet lie within
the range of interest of the three participants.
imizing the number of covered tasks in a campaign.
This is done by a new objective function that assigns
a higher priority to tasks that will be completed by
a fewer number of bidders–penalizing redundant task
assignment.
2) To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first
to use redundant task assignment in formulating a new
bidding procedure that maximizes the CR of auction-
based reputation-aware MCS systems.
3) Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate a re-
markable enhancement in task completion ratios com-
pared to other methods in the recent literature.
4) Similar to [18], [19], our proposed bidding procedure
links the number of campaign tasks to the platform
budget, which is closer to real-life scenarios than ne-
glecting budget constraints [15] or assuming a constant-
yet-arbitrary budget [20].
II. AUCTIONS BASED ON REDUNDANCY-PENALIZING
BIDDING
In this section, we propose and discuss a new bidding
procedure, namely, the Redundancy-penalizing Bidding (RPB)
algorithm. Towards the goal of maximizing the CR of auctions,
RPB is based on the observation that tasks with fewer bidders
should be assigned a higher priority. This increases the odds
of accomplishing those tasks eventually.
A. System Model
Similar to previous work in the literature, the proposed bid-
ding procedure is a greedy algorithm that is an approximation
of the NP-hard problems of task allocation and auction winner
selection [8], [15], [18], [19]. The steps of the RPB algorithm
are given by algorithm listing 2, that is preceded by algorithm
listing 1, and followed by algorithm listings 3 and 4 [18], [19].
The whole pipeline is comprised of the following four stages,
on which we elaborate below: 1) Primary Winners Selection,
2) Redundancy Winners Selection, 3) Winners Payment De-
termination, 4) Secondary Winners Selection and Payment.
Symbols and notations that are used in the aforementioned
algorithm listings are given in Table I.
For every sensing campaign, there is a crowd of participants,
I, and each smartphone i ∈ {1, · · · , N} represents a partici-
pant in the auction. The platform sends the details of the M
campaign tasks, where tasks are indexed by j ∈ {1, · · · ,M}.
All of the participants should take part in the bidding process,
and each bidder should bid on at least one task within their
area of interest.
B. Collective and Descriptive Bidding
The research in [18], [19] highlighted the difference be-
tween two types of bidding, namely, collective bidding and
descriptive bidding. The former is the classical form of bid-
ding, commonly discussed in the literature, that resembles
a wholesale or bidding in bulk, where user i asks for one
collective payment in return for all the tasks in Ti ⊂ T . The
set T is comprised of all the tasks in a sensing campaign,
i.e., |T | = M , while Ti is the subset of tasks in which
the participant i is interested, i.e., |Ti| = Mi. In descriptive
bidding, however, a participant sends a list of tasks and a
separate bid for each of them. Throughout this document, we
refer to this list as the list of per-task user bids. The summation
of the per-task user bids for the user i is given by:
bi =
Mi∑
j=1
xij × bij , (1)
where bij is the bid of user i for task j (descriptive bid), and
xij is a binary flag indicating if the user i is interested in task
j or not. Unless the bidder is interested in only one task, the
sum of the descriptive bids is usually more than the collective
bid.
C. Primary Winners Selection
Following previous work in the literature [15], the proposed
pipeline starts by calculating the marginal contribution (or
marginal value) for each participant, as formulated by [15],
and then subtracts their collective bids from the resultant value
(line 3 in algorithm listing 1). In this formulation, namely,
the reputation-aware (RA) formulation, the collective bid of
user i, bci , is weighted by the user’s reputation score ri, such
that a high reputation score would result in lowering the bid,
and consequently increases the odds of selecting that user.
Afterwards, tasks are allocated to a set of winners, S, named
primary winners, (lines 5,6 in algorithm listing 1), that are
chosen such that the budget (same as platform utility in [15])
is preserved.
Algorithm 1 Determining Primary Winners
1: function GET PRIMARY WINNERS(V , Bc, R, P )
2: S ← Φ, Stasks ← Φ
3: h← argmax
i∈I
vri (S)− b
c
i
ri
4: while b
c
h
rh
< vrh
∧
S 6= P do
5: S ← S ∪ h , Stasks ← Th
6: h← argmax
i∈I\S
vri (S)− b
c
i
ri
7: end while
8: return S
9: end function
D. Redundancy Winners Selection
This sub-section highlights the main contribution of this
research. Various aspects may lead to the easiness of ac-
complishing certain tasks. e.g., their location, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. Hence, many participants might bid on them. Although
impactful on the CR, and hence on the utility of the platform,
as shown in the next section, unpopular tasks have not been
addressed efficiently by the previously proposed bidding meth-
ods. In this paper, we introduce a new redundancy factor
that is given by:
di = 1−maxt∈Ti{
1
|Γt| }, (2)
where di is the redundancy factor of user i (such that D is
the set of values for participants’ redundancy factor), and |Γt|
is the cardinality of the set of participants who are bidding on
the task t.
We need to increase the opportunity of user i (of being
selected) if i is interested in a task t ∈ Ti for which there are
a few bidders, i.e., if di is small. Hence, the more participants
bidding on a task, the less priority it gets. Towards this
goal, the platform adopts a procedure that is similar to the
primary winners selection procedure. Particularly, in order
to choose the set of redundancy winners SR, the platform
uses a weighted version of the reputation score, as given by
algorithm listing 2. This weighted reputation score is named
the redundancy-reputation factor and is given as
ui =
ri
di
, (3)
where ri is the reputation of user i (such that R is the set
of participants’ reputation values), and ui is the redundancy-
reputation factor of user i (such that U is the set of values
of participants’ redundancy-reputation factor). The higher the
ui, the higher the opportunity of user i to be selected as a
winner in the auction. The main idea proposed by this research
(penalizing redundant task assignment) can be seen in the
objective functions in lines 4 & 7 of algorithm listing 2. The
significant impact of the redundancy-reputation factor on the
attained clearance rates will be shown and discussed in the
Results and Discussion section. It is worth mentioning that
for reputation-unaware (RU) bidding [15], ri = 1 for user i.
TABLE I: Symbols and notations used in the algorithm listings
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
vj Value of task j V Set of values of tasks
vui (S) Reputational-Redundant value for user i over set S TS Set of tasks done by users in set S
vri (S) Reputational value for user i over set S B
c Set of collective bids by participants
T si (S
s) Set of tasks allocated for secondary winner i over the set Ss pi Payment to winner i
R Set of participants’ reputation values P Set of payments to participants
Algorithm 2 Identifying Redundancy Winners
1: Compute U for participants
2: function GET REDUNDANCY WINNERS(V , Bc, U , P )
3: SR ← Φ
4: h← argmax
i∈I
vui (S
R)− bciui
5: while b
c
h
uh
< vuh
∧
SR 6= P do
6: SR ← SR ∪ h , Stasks ← Th
7: h← argmax
i∈I\SR
vui (S
R)− bciui
8: end while
9: SR = SR \ (SR ∩ S)
10: return SR
11: end function
The platforms proceeds with the payment calculation for
both sets of winners, namely, the primary winners and the
redundancy winners. This is accomplished using the procedure
given in algorithm listing 3. The algorithm is comprised of two
consecutive loops; the first loop computes the payments of the
primary winners, and the second loop computes the payments
of the redundancy winners. Each of these loops is similar to
the payment computation procedure that is given in [18], [19].
Penalizing redundant task assignment results in saving the
platform’s budget, since the mathematical expression of the
budget B is given by:
B = V − P, (4)
where V is the sum of values of campaign tasks and P is the
sum of all payments to primary winners. In addition, compar-
ing line 9 with line 17 in algorithm listing 3 shows that the
payments computed using the redundancy-reputation factors
are higher than the payments calculated by the reputation
factor. Since we are concerned with minimizing the payments
in general, we update the redundancy winners in line 9 in
algorithm listing 2).
Given the budget of the platform as in (4), we can determine
the remaining budget that is available–before getting a negative
utility–to accomplish the tasks that have not been covered by
the chosen winners [19]. Since the reputation-aware version of
the proposed algorithm, RPB-RA, results in higher payments
(lines 16 − 18 in algorithm listing 3), we argue that it also
motivates participants to bid for the unpopular tasks.
The proposed algorithm so far has not adopted the descrip-
tive bidding of [18] and [19] at any of its stages. Basically, it
Algorithm 3 Compute Payments for Winners
1: function GET WINNERS PAYMENTS(V , Bc, S, SR, R,
U )
2: for i ∈ I do
3: pi ← 0
4: end for
5: for i ∈ S do
6: S′ ← S \ {i}, Θ = Φ
7: repeat
8: q ← argmax
V∈S′\Θ
(vrV(Θ)− b
c
V
rV
)
9: pi ← max(pi,min{vri (Θ)− (vrq(Θ)− b
c
q
rq
)})
10: Θ← Θ ∪ {q}
11: until b
c
q
rq
≥ vrq
∨
Θ = S′
12: end for
13: for i ∈ SR do
14: S′ ← SR \ {i}, Θ = Φ
15: repeat
16: q ← argmax
V∈S′\Θ
(vuV(Θ)− b
c
V
uV
)
17: pi ← max(pi,min{vui (Θ)− (vuq (Θ)−
bcq
uq
)})
18: Θ← Θ ∪ {q}
19: until b
c
q
uq
≥ vuq
∨
Θ = S′
20: end for
21: return P
22: end function
selects the primary winners, then determines the redundancy
winners, and then computes the payments for both. The type
of bidding provided by both sets of winners is collective,
and the auction management according to the aforementioned
algorithm listings is reputation aware. Hence, we would com-
pare (in terms of the attained clearance rates) the proposed
procedure (up to this point) to TSCM. However, in order
to include the 2SB-RA of [18] and [19] in the comparison,
one more stage should be added to the pipeline, namely,
the secondary winners selection, which adopts the descriptive
bidding approach.
E. Secondary Winners Selection
Unless the set of M tasks have been covered by the primary
and redundancy winners, the platform proceeds to the final
stage of the algorithm. Using the descriptive bids proposed
in our own recent work [18], [19]1, the platform determines
another set of winners, called the secondary winners Ss, to
whom the uncovered tasks are allocated. This is shown by
algorithm listing 4 which resembles that listing provided in
[19] except that the former takes SR into consideration. On
the expense of the budget, the platform pays the secondary
winners according to their descriptive bids in order to achieve
a higher CR. This takes place after trying to cover all tasks
by collective bidding through primary and redundant winners.
Unlike primary and redundant winners, while assigning un-
covered tasks to secondary winners, the platform ensures that
a task would not be covered more than once, for the sake of
better budget management.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, design choices were made such that the
values of the parameters are either identical or close to their
values in other research in the literature [8], [15], [19], to
facilitate the comparison. All simulations were done using
Matlab® 2015, on a PC with Intel Core-i7 2GHz processor
and 4GB of RAM.
The simulation is done in an area of (1000 m × 1000
m) in which participants and tasks are uniformly distributed.
Each participant is surrounded by an area of interest of 30m
radius as depicted in Fig. 1. The value of each task and
the participants’ collective bids vary uniformly in [1,5] and
[1,10] respectively. Similarly, the per-task bids vary uniformly
in the range [vj − α, vj + α], and we set α = 2 in our
simulations. The participants’ reputations are varied uniformly
from 0.6 to 0.9. We also mapped the redundancy factor
to the range [0.5, 1] in order to be close to the range of
the reputation to have nearly equal influence. For evaluating
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, the RPB-RA
algorithm, we compare its performance to two algorithms
from the literature, namely, Two-stage bidding (2SB) [18],
[19] and TSCM [15] as representatives of reputation-aware
techniques, all of which are online techniques, i.e., they
require an established connectivity between the platform and
the participants. The 2SB algorithm consists of only 3 stages:
1) Primary Winners Selection, 2) Primary Winners Payment
Determination, 3) Secondary Winners Selection and Payment.
The redundancy stage, which is the second stage in the
RPB-RA, is not included in it. As will be discussed below,
comparing 2SB to RPB-RA shows the impact of involving the
redundancy as a factor in managing auctions. Three aspects
are considered (allowed to vary) in our simulations which are:
the number of auctions, the number of tasks, and the number
of participants. Table II summarizes the simulated scenarios
and their corresponding parameter values.
A. The impact of varying the number of auctions on the CR
First, we investigate the effect of varying the number of held
auctions on the performance of the aforementioned algorithms.
1The code is publicly avialable through: bitbucket.org/isl aast/
descriptive-bidding-ccnc-2019/src/master/
Algorithm 4 Secondary Winners Selection and Payment
1: B = V − P
2: if Stasks 6= T then
3: Ss = Φ
4: T s = Φ
5: for i ∈ I \ {S ∪ SR} do
6: for t ∈ Ti do
7: if t ∈ Stasks then
8: Ti = Ti \ t
9: else if t ∈ T \ Stasks then
10: P s ← P s ∪ {i}
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: h← argmax
i∈Is
(vri (S
s)− bi(Ss)ri )
15: while bhrh + (rh × B) ≥ 0
∧
Ss 6= P s ∧ Stasks 6= T
do
16: Stasks ← Stasks ∪ T sh(Ss)
17: Ss ← Ss ∪ {h}
18: for i ∈ Is \ Ss do
19: for t ∈ Ti do
20: if t ∈ T sh then
21: Ti = Ti \ t
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: B = (B × rh)− bhrh
26: h← argmax
i∈Is\Ss
(vri (S
s)− bi(Ss)ri )
27: end while
28: end if
29: Outlier Detection(S, SR, Ss)
30: for s ∈ {S ∪ SR ∪ Ss} do
31: update rs
32: end for
33: return Ss
Fig. 3 shows that our algorithm results in a significant increase
in clearance rate, that is close to five times that of the TSCM
and two times that of 2SB. The average percentage of tasks
completion is nearly constant, regardless the number of held
auctions.
B. The impact of varying the number of tasks on the CR
In Fig. 4, we compare the performance of the three al-
gorithms, with regards to the achieved CR, under different
number of tasks. In addition, we assume that there are 100
participants in the area of interest who are ready to share their
sensing data. From Fig. 4, we can see that the CR always
increases with the increasing number of tasks, because more
tasks are added in the area of interest–of the participants–so the
winners perform more tasks and the CR increases accordingly.
TABLE II: A summary of the different simulated scenarios and their corresponding parameter values.
Impact of #Auctions Impact of #Tasks Impact of #Participants
Parameters Values Case Values Case Values Case
#Tasks 100 Constant 100-500 Increasing  by 100 100 Constant
#Participants 100 Constant 1000 Constant 100-1000 Increasing  by 100
#Auctions 100-1000 Increasing  by 100
5 for each tasks 
case Constant
5 for each 
participants case Constant
Fig. 3: The impact of varying the number of auctions on the
performance of different reputation-aware incentive mecha-
nisms.
It is clear that the RPB-RA outperforms the TSCM and 2SB
across a wide range of task number. The CR slightly exceeds
90% in case the number of tasks slightly exceeds 200 tasks.
We justify the significant increase in CR by highlighting
the fact that other techniques aim at maximizing the user and
the platform utility using only one stage of bidding (collective
bidding). However, towards the goal of optimizing the uti-
lization of the budget and better satisfy service demanders,
our algorithm realizes three winning stages throughout the
pipeline, with corresponding three types of winners. It is
important to mention that our algorithm does not increase
the budget of the platform, but it uses it more efficiently
and economically. Instead of leaving the unpopular tasks
uncovered till the stage of selecting secondary winners as
in 2SB, it covers these tasks first. Hence, it pays for the
redundancy winners using the collective bids which is cheaper
than the descriptive bids as discussed in [18], [19].
C. The impact of varying the number of participants on the
CR
As shown in Fig. 5, when the number of participants
increases, more candidates compete to be chosen by the
platform. Hence, the probability of finding a better choice of
winners, among the newly added participants, increases. Thus,
Fig. 4: The impact of varying the number of tasks on the per-
formance of different reputation aware incentive mechanisms
Fig. 5: The impact of varying the number of participants on
the performance of RPB-RA.
the CR increases. Our proposed method attains consistently
higher CR, though, compared to the other techniques. This
increase is approximately four times the CR of TSCM and
almost linear in the range of 100− 500 participants.
IV. CONCLUSION
This research is concerned with enhancing the quality
of task allocation in participatory auction-based MCS. We
proposed a new bidding procedure (RPB-RA) that maximizes
the CR by assigning higher priority to the unpopular sensing
tasks in a campaign, i.e., the tasks that are expected to be
completed by a fewer number of bidders. Our own previous
work addressed the maximization of CR using descriptive
bidding. However, to the best of our knowledge, this research
is the first to address the maximization of CR through penal-
izing redundant task assignment. The free parameters of the
proposed algorithm were identified and we simulated varying
scenarios (varying number of auctions, tasks, and participants)
in order to evaluate that framework. We showed that RPB-
RA outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches, with regards
to the CR. For future work, we will consider other factors
that may affect the selection of participants in multi-task
MCS environments. New optimization methods and theoretical
models for the platform utility will also be studied.
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